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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. 
ORDINANCES. RULES AND REGULATIONS 
The following rules are determinative in this appeal: 
U.R.C.P. Rule 59(a) 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of 
Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all or 
any of the parties and on all or part of the 
issues, for any of the following causes; . . 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence 
to justify the verdict or other 
decision, or that it is against 
law. 
U.R.C.P. Rule 50 Motion for Directed Verdict and for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict 
(b) Motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict. Whenever a motion for a directed 
verdict made at the close of all the evidence 
is denied or for any reason is not granted, 
the court is deemed to have submitted the 
action to the jury subject to a later 
determination of the legal questions raised 
by the motion. Not later than ten days after 
entry of judgment, a party who has moved for 
a directed verdict may move to have the 
verdict and any judgment entered thereon set 
aside and to have judgment entered in 
accordance with his motion for a directed 
verdict; or if a verdict was not returned 
such party, within ten days after the jury 
has been discharged, may move for judgment in 
accordance with his motion for directed 
verdict. A motion for a new trial may be 
joined with this motion, or a new trial may 
be prayed for in the alternative. If a 
verdict was returned the court may allow the 
judgment to stand or may reopen the judgment 
and either order a new trial or direct the 
entry of judgment as if the requested verdict 
had been directed. If no verdict was 
returned the court may direct the entry of 
judgment as if the requested verdict had been 
directed or may order a new trial. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. A Review of the Sufficiency of the Evidence on Appeal is Not 
Precluded bv Plaintiffs Failure to Move for a Directed Verdict 
Purina Trial, 
Defendant argues in his brief that the plaintiff has no 
standing to question the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal in 
light of his failure to move for a directed verdict during trial. 
In support of this proposition the defendant cites two cases, 
Henderson v. Meyer. 533 P.2d 290, 291 (Utah 1975), and Pollesche 
v, Transamerican Insurance Company. 27 U.2d 430, 497 P.2d 236 
(1972). Both Pollesche and Henderson involved rear end accidents 
with facts very similar to those at issue in the present case. 
In Pollesche the jury had returned a verdict for no cause of 
action against the plaintiffs. The Court found that evidence as 
to liability in the accident was disputed and that a reasonable 
jury could make the determination that there was negligence on 
the part of the plaintiff. In the course of its decision the 
Court stated in a footnote: 
Plaintiff, Marie Pollesche, argues that she 
should have received a directed verdict 
against the defendant on the issue of 
liability because the verdict and judgment 
are not sustained by the evidence. The 
record does not reveal any motion by counsel 
for plaintiff for a directed verdict. The 
failure of a party to make a motion for a 
directed verdict not only forecloses the 
trial court from consideration of a motion 
for judgment not withstanding the verdict, 
but such failure in addition precludes the 
appellate court from reviewing the 
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the 
verdict. Rule 50(b), U.R.C.P.; Brigham v. 
Moon Lake Electric Assoc.f 24 U.2d 292, 296, 
470 P.2d 393 (1970). Consequently plaintiff 
may not allege error on the part of the trial 
court in its denial of the motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
Pollesche v. Transamerican Insurance Company. 27 U.2d at 
433. fn.l. Henderson, supra, likewise dealt with a plaintiff who 
had brought a claim against a defendant who had injured a 
plaintiff in a rear end collision. As in Pollesche. the jury 
entered a verdict in favor of the defendant. However, on appeal, 
the Supreme Court parted ways with the Pollesche court in 
reversing the trial court's judgment on the basis that under the 
facts of Henderson there was no ability for reasonable minds to 
disagree as to the fact that the defendant was negligent. It is 
in this context that the Henderson court stated: 
The law is to the effect that one who does 
not move for a directed verdict generally has 
no standing to urge on appeal that the 
evidence does not support the judgment. . * . 
However, an exception exists where plain 
error appears in the record and it would 
result in a miscarriage of justice to affirm 
the judgment (citations omitted). 
Henderson, supra at 291-92. 
As for the Court statement in Pollesche. the plaintiff has 
no argument with the proposition that a party who fails to make a 
motion for directed verdict in trial is not in a position to ask 
for a judgment not withstanding the verdict after a jury has made 
its decision. This is all footnote 1 in the Pollesche case 
stateso To read the Pollesche footnote as broadly as the 
defendant would like, however, would fly in its face of the 
language in the decision following the footnote. Immediately 
following footnote 1 Pollesche discusses at length the standard 
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used in reviewing a trial court's grant or denial of a Motion for 
New Trial on the basis of insufficiency of evidence. It is clear 
from Pollesche itself that while a review of a denial of a motion 
for judgment not withstanding the verdict on the basis of 
insufficiency of the evidence is precluded by a failure to make a 
motion for directed verdict in trial, the same is not true for 
reviewing a motion for new trial that has been denied by the 
trial court. Henderson does not discuss this distinction at all 
in its decision. The most recent reference to the concept that 
failure to move for directed verdict precludes a later review of 
evidentiary sufficiency appears in Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14 
(Utah 1988), where the Court, once again in a footnote, cites 
Pollesche for the proposition that, "ordinarily, the failure to 
make a motion for a directed verdict forecloses consideration of 
a later motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and any 
appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support 
the verdict. Supra, at 15, fn.l. 
Rule 59 contemplates that there is the ability of a party 
after trial to make a separate legal challenge to the evidentiary 
sufficiency of a jury's verdict in addition to the procedures 
outlined in Rule 50 for motion for directed verdict and motion 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. However, no Utah case 
discusses at length the relationship between Rule 50 ("Motion for 
Directed Verdict and for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict) 
and Rule 59 ("new trials; amendments of judgment"). 
The best discussion of these issues appears in Brigham v. 
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Moon Lake Electric Associationf 24 U.2d 292, 470 P.2d 393 (Utah 
1970), cited in footnote 1 of Pollesche. Moon Lake suggests that 
where a motion for directed verdict has been made in the trial, a 
challenge to the evidentiary sufficiency of a jury's verdict may 
be made immediately after the verdict is presented by means of a 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, within the time 
constraints set forth under Rule 59 by way of a motion for new 
trial. Moon Lake suggests that failure to make a motion for 
directed verdict in the trial itself does not preclude the option 
for a party to make a motion for new trial alleging that the 
verdict must be set aside based upon insufficiency of the 
evidence. 
The court should take this opportunity to clarify the 
Pollesche footnote, the language in Henderson v. Mever, and the 
Hansen v. Stewart footnote and distinguish between the procedures 
and remedies in Rule 50 and Rule 59. Given the defendant's 
argument, it is important to have an express statement that the 
failure to move for directed verdict does not preclude the 
possibility of challenging the legal sufficiency of a verdict 
through the means of a motion for new trial. 
II. There is no Evidence Whatsoever to Support the Jury's 
Verdict that the Defendant was that Negligent. 
In his brief defendant makes no attempt to justify or excuse 
his actions other than to say that Ma reasonably prudent person 
cannot look everywhere at once." Appellees brief, p.3. While it 
is true that the burden of proving negligence rests with the 
plaintiff, the facts clearly show that this accident was caused 
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